Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations - Issues for Congress by Niksch, Larry A.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code IB98045
Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations —
Issues for Congress
Updated November 7, 2002
Larry A. Niksch





U.S. Interests in South Korea
Recent Issues
Relations with North Korea
Nuclear Weapons
North Korea’s Missile Program
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Conventional Force Reductions and Pullbacks
North Korea’s Inclusion on the U.S. Terrorism List
Food Aid
North Korean Refugees in China
Responding to South Korea’s Sunshine Policy
U.S.-South Korean Military Issues
Political Issues
IB98045 11-07-02
        Congressional Research Service    ˜    The Library of Congress
Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations — Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
The United States maintains a strong,
multifaceted alliance relationship with South
Korea that has for decades served vital inter-
ests of both sides.  Against the background of
continuing difficulties in dealing with North
Korea and the dramatic consequences of the
Asian economic crisis, the two governments
face a range of security, economic, and politi-
cal issues that involve the Congress in its
oversight and  appropriations capacities, and
in frequent exchanges between congressional
offices and the South Korean government.
Heading the list of issues is how to deal
with the  North Korean regime.  The Bush
Administration seeks policy changes from
North Korea regarding weapons of mass
destruction, conventional forces, and interna-
tional inspections of its nuclear facilities.
Tensions arose after North Korea revealed a
secret nuclear program in October 2002.  The
Bush Administration also faces policy deci-
sions on food aid to North Korea, North Ko-
rea’s inclusion on the U.S. terrorism list, and
U.S. responses to South Korea’s “sunshine
policy” toward North Korea.  President Kim
Dae-jung seeks reconciliation with North
Korea following the historical North-South
summit meeting of June 2000.  He has urged
the United States to engage North Korea and
make concessions to Pyongyang as a support
for his policy.  The Bush Administration’s
position on the sunshine policy is mixed,
supporting some elements but having reserva-
tions about others.
The sunshine policy also has resulted in
mounting controversy in South Korea over the
presence of 37,000 U.S. troops.  Growing
numbers of South Koreans seek a reduction of
U.S. military forces.  Incidents between U.S.
military personnel and South Korean civilians
has necessitated U.S.-South Korean negotia-
tions on several such issues.
South Korea is an important economic
partner of the United States.  The United
States has sought to influence South Korean
economic reforms arising from the 1997 Asian
financial crisis.  Bilateral trade disputes have
resurfaced in 2000 and 2001 regarding auto-
mobiles, pharmaceuticals, beef, and steel.
Intellectual property rights remain a point of
contention.
South Korea has become more demo-
cratic politically, a success for U.S. policy
since 1987.  President Kim Dae-jung
approaches the end of his term with declining
popularity and growing criticism over his




During the visit to North Korea by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly,
October 3-5, 2002, North Korea admitted the existence of a secret nuclear weapons program
based on uranium enrichment.  The Bush Administration’s initial reaction was a demand
that North Korea place the program under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and dismantle it under IAEA supervision.  The Administration secured
Japanese and South Korean support for this position and asked China for cooperation.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Interests in South Korea
U.S. interests in the Republic of Korea (R.O.K. — South Korea) involve a wide range
of security, economic, and political concerns.  The United States has remained committed
to maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula since the 1950-1953 Korean War.   The United
States agreed to defend South Korea from external aggression in the 1954 Mutual Defense
Treaty.  The United States maintains about 37,000 troops there to supplement the
650,000-strong South Korean armed forces.  This force is intended to deter North Korea’s
(the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — D.P.R.K.) 1.2 million-man army, which is
deployed in forward positions near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing North and South
Korea.  Since 1991, attention has focused on the implications of North Korea’s drive to
develop nuclear weapons (see CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
Program, for background on this set of important issues) and long range missiles, and severe
food shortages in North Korea.
The United States  played a major role in fostering South Korea’s remarkable economic
growth, and has carefully monitored and supported international efforts to help South Korea
deal with its current economic and financial crisis, the most serious since the Korean war.
U.S. economic assistance to South Korea, from 1945 to 1971, totaled $3.8 billion.  The acute
financial crisis in late 1997 saw Seoul receive a $57 billion bailout from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).  The United States is South Korea’s largest trading partner and largest
export market.  South Korea is the seventh largest U.S. trading partner.  The United States
has long viewed South Korean political stability as crucial to the nation’s economic
development, to maintaining the security balance on the peninsula, and to preserving peace
in northeast Asia.  However, U.S. officials over the years have pressed the South Korean
administration with varying degrees of intensity to gradually liberalize its political process,
broaden the popular base of its government, and release political prisoners.  In recent years,




Relations with North Korea
As part of a policy review toward North Korea, President Bush issued a statement on
June 6, 2001, outlining policy objectives related to implementation of the U.S.-North Korean
1994 Agreed Framework on North Korea’s nuclear program, North Korea’s missile program,
and its conventional forces.  He stated that if North Korea took positive actions in response
to the U.S. approach, the United States “will expand our efforts to help the North Korean
people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.”  President Bush’s designation of North
Korea as part of an “axis of evil” in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union address clarified
the Administration’s policy that had emerged after the June 6 statement.  The policy is aimed
at reducing and/or eliminating basic elements of North Korean military power, including
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons-grade
materials, missiles, and conventional artillery and rocket launchers positioned on the
demilitarized zone (DMZ) within range of the South Korean capital, Seoul.  The
Administration’s emphasis on WMDs mounted after the Central Intelligence Agency gained
documentary evidence in Afghanistan that al Qaeda seeks WMDs and plans new attacks on
the United States.  This reportedly influenced the Bush Administration to broaden the
definition of the war against terrorism to include states like North Korea that potentially
could supply WMDs to al Qaeda.
The Administration’s strategy is to employ public accusations and warnings to pressure
North Korea to make policy changes regarding its military assets in line with U.S. objectives.
Since July 2001, the Bush Administration has warned that it will suspend construction of the
two light water nuclear reactors in North Korea (a provision of the 1994 U.S.-North Korean
nuclear Agreed Framework) unless North Korea soon comes into compliance with its
obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency to allow full-scope inspections of
nuclear facilities, including the secret uranium enrichment program North Korea admitted
to in October 2002.  The Bush Administration made a number of statements calling on North
Korea to pull back artillery and rocket launchers from the DMZ.  Beginning with statements
in November 2001 and dramatically in the State of the Union address and in subsequent
pronouncements, the Bush Administration set a demand that North Korea stop the export of
missiles and weapons of mass destruction to the Middle East and South Asia, eliminate these
weapons from its arsenal, and allow verification of such steps.  President Bush’s repeated
declarations since the State of the Union that he would not stand by while this threat mounts
constitute a broader warning to North Korea alongside the explicit warning of shutting down
the light water reactors.  
Administration officials have said that they want a comprehensive negotiation with
North Korea on all these issues.  However, they add that the Administration will not
negotiate until North Korea ends the secret uranium enrichment program, which it revealed
in October 2002.  The Administration has given no indication that it would offer North Korea
reciprocal measures, including reciprocal military measures, for North Korean agreement and
steps to reduce its military power in these areas.  Public statements by the Administration
continually call for North Korea to take actions unilaterally.  During his visit to South Korea
in February 2002, President Bush issued a general offer to “welcome North Korea into the
family of nations, and all the benefits, which would be trade, commerce and exchanges.”
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Bush Administration officials reportedly have indicated in private remarks that the
Administration believes that it does not have to offer strict reciprocal measures or
compensation for North Korean concessions.
In June 2002, Administration officials placed food aid to North Korea as a new agenda
item for U.S.-North Korean negotiations.  Previously, negotiations with the North Korean
government were carried out by the United Nations World Food Program.  The U.S. officials
announced new food aid of 100,000 tons of grain but asserted that future food aid would
depend on North Korea agreeing to three conditions: access of food aid donors to provinces
(mainly in the north and northeast) which the North Korean government has barred aid
donors from entering; a larger monitoring capability for the donors; and allowing donors to
conduct a nation-wide nutritional survey.
Nuclear Weapons.  U.S. policy since 1994 has been based largely on the U.S.-North
Korean Agreed Framework of October 1994.  The Agreed Framework was negotiated in
response to U.S. concerns over nuclear facilities that North Korea was developing at a site
called Yongbyon.  Existing facilities included a five megawatt nuclear reactor and a
plutonium reprocessing plant.  Two larger reactors were under construction.  U.S.
intelligence estimates concluded that these facilities could give North Korea the capability
to produce over 30 atomic weapons annually.   North Korea had concluded a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992, which requires
North Korea to report all nuclear programs to the IAEA and gives the IAEA the right to
conduct a range of inspections of North Korea’s nuclear installations.  However, North Korea
obstructed or refused IAEA inspections in 1993-94, including refusal to allow an IAEA
special inspection of a underground facility, which the IAEA believed was a nuclear waste
site.  The IAEA hoped that a special inspection would provide evidence of past North Korean
productions of nuclear-weapons grade plutonium.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld estimated
that North Korea has from two to five warheads in a statement of August 2001 in Moscow.
The U.S. National Intelligence Council published an estimate in December 2001 “that North
Korea has produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.” 
The Agreed Framework provides for the suspension of operations and construction of
North Korea’s “graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities” and  the storage of nuclear
reactor fuel that North Korea had removed from the five megawatt reactor in May 1994.  It
provides to North Korea 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually until two light water nuclear
reactors (LWRs) are constructed in North Korea.  The United States is obligated to facilitate
the heavy oil shipments and organize the construction of the light LWRs.  The IAEA
monitors the freeze of the designated facilities and activities.   The special inspection of the
suspected nuclear waste site and the inspection of the stored fuel rods are postponed.  The
Agreed Framework states that before North Korea receives nuclear materials for the LWRs,
it is obligated to come into full compliance with its obligations as a signatory to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty with regard to its past nuclear activities.  Clinton Administration
officials testified that this clause will obligate North Korea to allow  IAEA inspection of the
suspected waste site and the stored fuel rods.  They also testified that any additional North
Korean nuclear programs, including any secret programs, are covered by the 1992 safeguards
agreement and are subject immediately to IAEA safeguards, including inspections.
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was created to
implement provisions of the Agreed Framework related to heavy oil shipments and
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construction of the light water reactors.  Lead members are the United States, Japan, South
Korea, and the European Union.  Japan and South Korea are to provide most of the
financing, estimated at $5-6 billion, for the construction of the light water reactors.  The
Agreed Framework set a target date of 2003 for completion of the first of the light water
reactors.  There have been delays in the project, caused by North Korean obstructionist
tactics, by legal and bureaucratic obstacles, and by an apparent Clinton Administration policy
of not hurrying implementation.  KEDO officials now project the completion of the first light
water reactor in 2008.  Bush Administration officials estimate that by 2005, construction will
reach the point when nuclear components will be delivered to North Korea.  KEDO also has
faced rising costs of providing the annual heavy oil allotments to North Korea.  Since
October 1995, North Korea has received the annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy oil.
The cost to the United States of the heavy oil and financial support of KEDO from FY1995
through FY2002 is $378 million  Congressional appropriations for the heavy oil and KEDO
have risen from $30 million in FY1996 to $55 million in FY2001.  Congress granted the
Bush Administration request for $95 million for FY2002.
The Bush Administration considered the Agreed Framework in its North Korea policy
review in the spring of 2001.  Among the options it considered was a proposal floated by the
Clinton Administration in 2000 to eliminate one of the light water reactors and substitute
conventional power facilities of equal capacity.  President Bush’s policy statement of June
6, 2001, declared an objective of “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework
relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities.”  According to Administration officials, the
policy insists that North Korea soon begin the process of coming into full compliance with
its obligations to the IAEA.  The Administration asserts that North Korea must begin this
process well prior to the point when the Agreed Framework specifies that North Korea must
be in full compliance, since the IAEA states that, once North Korea allows a full range of
IAEA inspections,  the IAEA will need three to four years to determine whether North Korea
is in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. U.S. officials reportedly
have said that point will come by 2005 when construction of the first light water reactor will
reach the stage of delivery of nuclear components.  Beginning in July 2001, Administration
officials warned that if North Korea does not begin the process of compliance with
obligations to the IAEA, the Administration would suspend the light water reactor project.
North Korea rejected the Bush Administration’s call for earlier compliance with the
IAEA, demanding instead that the United States supply it with electricity until the
construction of the light water reactors is completed.  In March 2002, the Bush
Administration used the right of waiver and refused to issue a certification to Congress that
North Korea was complying with the Agreed Framework.  Administration officials described
this an added warning to North Korea to begin compliance with the IAEA.
North Korea’s admission of a secret uranium enrichment program in October 2002
confirmed U.S. intelligence information that had built up since 1998 concerning such a
program.  North Korea used the admission to warn that it possessed “big powerful weapons,”
and it demanded a negotiation with the United States to include a non-aggression pact and
a guarantee against a U.S. military and/or nuclear attack, and an end to U.S. stifling of North
Korean economic development.  It later threatened to re-open the nuclear facilities shut down
under the Agreed Framework, expand weapons proliferation to other countries, and conduct
a new long-range missile test.
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The Bush Administration’s initial policy response to the secret program consists of:
(1) Immediate priority to Iraq.  President Bush reportedly says that he does not want two
simultaneous crises.  U.S. officials say they will rely on diplomacy and expect diplomacy to
run well into 2003.
(2) No immediate termination or suspension of the Agreed Framework. Many
Administration officials have stated that the Agreed Framework will be terminated.
President Bush reportedly told Japanese and South Korean leaders in late October 2002 that
the Agreed Framework would be continued indefinitely.  Statements indicate a debate within
the Administration, possibly over whether to continue the Agreed Framework or the timing
of ending it.  The timing question could be related to the policy of priority to Iraq.  The
scheduled oil shipments to North Korea appear to be intensifying the debate and pressures
within the Administration over policy toward the Agreed Framework.  Following the 2002
U.S. elections, Congress will complete legislation of the FY2003 foreign operations
appropriations bill, which contains money for KEDO and the heavy oil shipments.  Japan and
South Korea favor continuing the Agreed Framework indefinitely.
(3) Rejecting negotiation of any new agreement with North Korea over the secret
program and insisting that North Korea first abide by its past nuclear agreements, especially
placing the secret program under IAEA safeguards and dismantling it under IAEA
supervision.  Administration officials argue that negotiation of a new agreement would
reward North Korea for its violation of its previous nuclear agreements.  They indicate that
the Administration would continue dialogue with North Korea, including periodic meetings
between State Department officials and North Korean officials at the United Nations.  They
have not indicated the purpose of dialogue in the absence of a negotiation, an important issue
in future U.S. diplomacy.
(4) Forming an international coalition to pressure North Korea to end the secret
program.  President Bush, Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi, and South Korea’s President
Kim Dae-jung issued a statement at the APEC summit on October 26, 2002, that North
Korea should “dismantle this program in a prompt and verifiable manner and to come into
full compliance with all its international [nuclear] commitments.”  The Administration has
agreed to continued Japanese and South Korean talks with North Korea but has urged Japan
not to commit any of the economic aid (an estimated $10 billion) that Prime Minister
Koizumi promised to North Korea in the Japan-North Korean agreement to begin talks to
normalize relations on September 17, 2002.  Japanese officials have stated repeatedly that
Japan will not commit any aid until North Korea satisfies U.S. and Japanese concerns over
the secret uranium enrichment program and other security issues.  Coordination of U.S. and
Japanese diplomacy toward North Korea is an important issue for the Bush Administration.
The Administration has asked for Chinese cooperation and reportedly requested that China
warn North Korea against re-opening the nuclear facilities frozen under the Agreed
Framework.
(5) Stating that the Administration does not intend to attack North Korea militarily but
warn of the prospect of economic sanctions if North Korea does not end the secret program.
Administration officials indicate that the Administration would not consider sanctions until
the Iraq issue is settled.  References to economic sanctions have produced an open dispute
with South Korea; President Kim Dae-jung stated that he is unalterably opposed to economic
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sanctions. He said in a speech of October 30, 2002, that sanctions “would likely lead to a
repeat of the nuclear crisis in the early 1990s.”
North Korea’s Missile Program.  On August 31, 1998, North Korea test fired a
three stage missile, dubbed the Taepo Dong-1 by the U.S. Government.  The missile flew
over Japanese territory out into the Northwest Pacific.  Parts of the missile landed in waters
close to Alaska.  North Korea claimed that the third stage of the missile was an attempt to
launch a satellite.  U.S. intelligence agencies responded with a conclusion that North Korea
was close to developing a Taepo Dong-1 missile that would have the range to reach Alaska,
the U.S. territory of Guam, the U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and the
Japanese island of Okinawa, home to thousands of U.S. military personnel and their
dependents.  Reports since 2000 cite U.S. intelligence findings that North Korea is
developing a Taepo Dong-2  intercontinental missile that would be capable of striking
Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast with nuclear weapons.  U.S. and Japanese
intelligence agencies reportedly estimated in 2001 that North Korea had deployed up to 100
medium-range Nodong missiles.  First tested in 1993, the Nodong missile has an estimated
range of 600-900 miles.  The upper range would cover all of Japan including Okinawa.
Throughout the 1990s, North Korea exported short-range Scud missiles and Scud
missile technology to a number of countries in the Middle East.  After 1995, it exported
Nodong missiles and Nodong technology to Iran, Pakistan, and Libya.  In 1998, Iran and
Pakistan successfully tested medium range missiles modeled on the Nodong.  North Korea
reportedly shipped 50 complete Nodong missiles to Libya in 1999.
The test launch of the Taepo Dong-1 missile spurred the Clinton Administration to
intensify diplomacy on North Korea’s missile program.  The Administration’s 1999 Perry
initiative set the goal of “verifiable cessation of testing, production and deployment of
missiles exceeding the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the
complete cessation of export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology
associated with them.”  Dr. Perry seemed to envisage the negotiation of a series of
agreements on the individual components of the North Korean missile program; each
agreement would build progressively toward termination of the entire program.  The Perry
initiative offered North Korea steps to normalize U.S.-North Korean relations, an end to U.S.
economic sanctions, and other economic benefits in return for positive North Korean actions
on the missile and nuclear issues.  This produced in September 1999 a qualified North
Korean promise not to conduct further long-range missile tests, which North Korea repeated
in June 2000.  The Clinton Administration responded by announcing in September 1999 a
lifting of a significant number of U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea.  It published
the implementing regulation for the lifting of these sanctions on June 19, 2000.
No further agreements on missiles were concluded by the end of the Clinton
Administration.  Secretary of State Albright visited Pyongyang in October 2000, and missile
talks intensified.  Unlike Perry’s view of a series of agreements, the Clinton Administration
proposed a comprehensive deal covering all aspects of the issue. North Korea offered to
prohibit exports of medium and long-range missiles and related technologies in exchange for
“in-kind assistance.” (North Korea previously had demanded $1 billion annually.)  It also
offered to ban permanently missile tests and production above a certain range in exchange
for “in kind assistance” and assistance in launching commercial satellites.  Pyongyang also
offered to cease the deployment of Nodong and Taepo Dong missiles.  It proposed that
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President Clinton visit North Korea to conclude an agreement.  The negotiations reportedly
stalled over four issues: North Korea’s refusal to include short-range Scud missiles in the
commitment to cease the development and deployment of missiles; North Korea’s non-
response to the U.S. position that it would have to agree to dismantle the already deployed
Nodong missiles; the details of U.S. verification of a missile agreement; and the nature and
size of a U.S. financial compensation  package.  North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told
European Union officials in May 2001 that he would continue a moratorium on missile test
launches until 2003, and he agreed to extend the moratorium indefinitely in his meeting with
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi on September 17, 2002.  In response to Japanese and U.S.
pressure regarding its secret uranium enrichment program, North Korea warned on
November 5, 2002, that it would conduct another long-range missile test.
President Bush’s June 6, 2001 statement set a goal of “verifiable constraints on North
Korea’s missile programs and a ban on its missile exports.”  Administration officials have
emphasized the necessity of a strong verification mechanism in any missile accord.  After
the January 2002 State of the Union speech, the Administration repeatedly described North
Korea as a dangerous proliferator of missiles, and they demanded that North Korea cease
exporting missiles and missile technology.  However, the Administration has offered no
specific negotiating proposal on missiles.  
Weapons of Mass Destruction.  The Bush Administration’s emphasis on North
Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) resulted from the September 11 terrorist
attack.  The Clinton Administration stressed nuclear issues but did not include North Korea’s
chemical and biological weapons as priority elements in the Perry initiative.  A Pentagon
report on the North Korean military, released in September 2000, stated that North Korea had
developed up to 5,000 metric tons of chemical munitions and had the capability to produce
biological weapons, including anthrax, smallpox, the bubonic plague, and cholera.  The Bush
Administration expresses a fear that North Korea might sell nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons to a terrorist group like al Qaeda or that al Qaeda might acquire these weapons from
a Middle East country that had purchased them from North Korea.  In November 2001,
President Bush included North Korea’s WMDs as part of the “war against terrorism” when
he stated: “We want to know.  Are they developing weapons of mass destruction?  And they
ought to stop proliferating.  So part of the war on terror is to deny terrorist weapons.”  In the
State of the Union on January 29, 2002, he described North Korea as “a regime arming with
missiles and weapons of mass destruction.”  Upon departing for his trip to East Asia,
President Bush stated on February 16, 2002, that “America will not allow  North Korea and
other dangerous regimes to threaten freedom with weapons of mass destruction.”  The Bush
Administration has not accused North Korea of providing terrorist groups with WMDs.
When asked about this in a joint press conference with South Korea’s Defense Minister on
November 15, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld answered “we do not have
anything specific.”  There are reports from the early 1990s that North Korea exported nuclear
technology to Iran and that North Korea assisted Syria and Iran to develop chemical and
biological weapons capabilities.
Conventional Force Reductions and Pullbacks.  Before and after taking office,
Bush officials stated that the Administration would give conventional force issues priority
in diplomacy toward North Korea.  These officials stressed the objective of securing a
withdrawal of North Korean artillery and multiple rocket launchers from the positions just
north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), where they threaten Seoul, located just 25 miles
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south of the DMZ.  The Bush June 6, 2001 statement set the goal of “a less threatening
[North Korean] conventional military posture.” Advocates of such an initiative argue that
North Korea might be more interested in a negotiation because of the progressive weakening
of its conventional forces in the 1990s.  They point out that monitoring of a pullback of
North Korean artillery and multiple rocket launchers from the DMZ would be easier to
monitor than any agreements on nuclear or missile issues.  They believe that easing the
central military confrontation on the DMZ is the key to resolving other military issues,
including weapons of mass destruction.
Bush Administration statements hold that North Korea should withdraw unilaterally its
artillery and rocket launchers from the DMZ in order to facilitate negotiations with the
United States.  According to the Washington Post, February 2, 2002, Secretary of State Colin
Powell said that North Korea should remove its artillery from the DMZ as a good will
gesture.  President Bush stated on February 16, 2002, that North Korea would “be told
directly by us during conversations. . .Move your arms back” from the DMZ.  This stated
goal of near-term North Korean force pullbacks contrasts sharply with a U.S.-South Korean
study announced on February 27, 2002, on conventional force reductions.  The study
concentrated on confidence-building measures with North Korea (military exchanges of
personnel and information) as a short- to medium-range goal.  The study postulates actual
force reductions as a distant objective.  The study plans in the future to examine strategy and
the details of actual force reductions.  Some observers believe that this joint study suggests
that the Bush Administration has de-emphasized seeking conventional forces reductions and
pullbacks in favor of more modest confidence-building proposals, which date back to the
1980s.  They attribute this to South Korean opposition to negotiations on conventional
forces, possible opposition from elements of the U.S. military, and the Bush Administration’s
reluctance to offer North Korea reciprocal military measures involving U.S. forces.
North Korea’s response to Bush Administration statements have denounced the
Administration for proposing unilateral North Korean withdrawals from the DMZ.  North
Korea also used this to reject the general U.S. proposal to open talks.  However, North
Korean statements also have pointed out that Pyongyang in the past has proposed
conventional force negotiations and pullbacks (these past proposals have included the total
withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea).  Japanese press reports in September 2002
asserted that North Korea had told Russian officials that it wanted to reduce its conventional
forces and negotiate force pullbacks with the United States.  Some experts believe that the
Bush Administration will have to include mutuality and military reciprocity in any proposal
for conventional force negotiations.  They argue that the United States and South Korea will
have to offer North Korea a pullback of some U.S. and R.O.K. forces from the DMZ in order
to obtain North Korean agreement to pull back artillery, rocket launchers, and other forces.
Bush Administration pronouncements on the necessity of North Korean pullbacks have not
included any reference to mutuality or military reciprocity.  As indicated previously, the
President’s June 6 list of possible incentives to North Korea were political and economic in
nature rather than military. 
North Korea’s Inclusion on the U.S. Terrorism List.  Beginning in February
2000, North Korea began to demand that the United States remove it from the U.S. list of
terrorist countries.  It made this a pre-condition for the visit of a high level North Korean
official to Washington.  Although it later dropped this pre-condition, it continued to demand
removal from the terrorist list.  In response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001,
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North Korea issued statements opposing terrorism and signed two United Nations
conventions against terrorism.
South Korea also urged the United States to remove North Korea from the terrorism list
in order to open the way for North Korea to receive financial aid from the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  U.S. law P.L. 95-118, the International Financial
Institutions Act,  requires the United States to oppose any proposals in the IMF and World
Bank to extend loans or other financial assistance to countries on the terrorism list.  The Kim
Dae-jung Administration advised the Clinton Administration in July 2000 to drop from
consideration past North Korean  terrorist acts against South Korea.  The Kim Dae-jung
Administration advocated North Korean admission to the World Bank and the IMF.
Japan urged the Clinton and Bush administrations to keep North Korea on the terrorism
list until North Korea resolved Japan’s concerns.  Japan’s concerns are North Korea’s
sanctuary to members of the terrorist Japanese Red Army organization and evidence that
North Korea  kidnapped and is holding at least ten Japanese citizens.  The Clinton
Administration gave Japan’s concern increased priority in U.S. diplomacy in 2000.  Secretary
Albright raised the issue of kidnapped Japanese when she met with Kim Jong-il in
Pyongyang in October 2000.  A high ranking State Department official met with family
members of kidnapped Japanese in February 2001 and reportedly assured them that the Bush
Administration would not remove North Korea from the terrorism list. (See CRS Report
RL30613, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?)  Kim Jong-il’s admission of kidnapping
Japanese during the Kim-Koizumi summit of September 2002 did not resolve the issue.  His
claim that 8 of the 13 admitted kidnapped victims are dead and his ambivalence regarding
the return to Japan of the five living Japanese raised new issues for the Japanese government,
including information about the deaths of the kidnapped victims, North Korean
compensation to the families of the victims, and the possibility that more Japanese were
kidnapped.  The five living kidnapped Japanese returned to Japan in October 2002 for a visit,
but North Korea did not allow their children in North Korea to go to Japan.
  In June 2002, the Bush Administration appeared to add conditions for removing North
Korea from the U.S. terrorist list.  Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated in a
June 2002 speech that North Korea would have to acknowledge the 1983 bombing of the
South Korean presidential delegation in Rangoon, Burma, and the blowing up of a South
Korean airliner in 1987.  
Food Aid.  Agriculture production in North Korea began to decline in the mid-1980s.
Severe food shortages appeared in 1990-1991.  In September 1995, North Korea appealed
for international food assistance.  From 1996 through 2001, the United States contributed
about 1.8 million tons of food aid to North Korea through the United Nations World Food
Program.  The Bush Administration announced 100,000 tons of new food aid in May 2001
and 105,000 tons in December 2001.  The Bush June 6 statement indicated that it would use
food aid as a negotiating incentive to North Korea in diplomacy over nuclear, missile, and
conventional force issues.  The Bush offer to “expand our efforts to help the North Korean
people” suggested continued U.S. food aid but linked in part to progress on issues like
missiles, conventional forces, and North Korea’s nuclear program.  The Clinton
Administration used food aid to secure North Korean agreement to certain types of
negotiations and North Korean agreement to allow a U.S. inspection of the suspected nuclear
site at Kumchangri.  Critics have asserted that the use of food aid in this way negates
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consideration of two other issues: the weaknesses in monitoring food aid distribution in
North Korea and the absence of North Korean economic reforms, especially agricultural
reforms.
The U.N. World Food Program requested donations of 611,000 tons of food for North
Korea in 2002, but it cites a decline in donations.  It acknowledges that the North Korean
government places restrictions on its monitors’ access to the food distribution system, but
it believes that most of its food aid reaches needy people.  Several private aid groups,
however, withdrew from North Korea because of such restrictions and suspicions that the
North Korean regime was diverting food aid to the military or the communist elite living
mainly in the capital of Pyongyang.  It is generally agreed that the regime gives priority to
these two groups in its overall food distribution policy.  The regime, too, refuses to adopt
agricultural reforms similar to those of fellow communist countries, China and Vietnam,
including dismantling of Stalinist collective farms.  While such reforms resulted in big
increases in food production in China and Vietnam, North Korea continues to experience
sizeable food shortages year after year with no end in sight.  It is estimated that one to three
million North Koreans died of malnutrition between 1995 and 2002.
The conditions set on future food aid by the Bush Administration in June 2002, cited
above, appears to result from two factors.  One is the influence of Andrew Natsios, the
Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, who was intimately involved in
food aid programs to North Korea in the 1990s.  His 2002 book, The Great North Korean
Famine, highlights a view that the North Korean government employed duplicity and
manipulation of food aid donors.  The second factor may be the influence of the newly-
emerging issue of North Korean refugees in China.
North Korean Refugees in China.  This issue confronted governments after March
2002 when North Korean refugees sought asylum in foreign diplomatic missions in China
and the Chinese government sought to prevent access to the missions and forcibly removed
refugees from the Japanese and South Korean embassies.  The refugee exodus from North
Korea into China’s Manchuria region began in the mid-1990s as the result of the dire food
situation in North Korea’s provinces in the far north and northeast along the Chinese border.
The North Korean government reportedly suspended the state food rationing system in these
provinces beginning about 1993 and never allowed international food aid donors into them.
The number of refugees is unknown, since China has not issued official figures.  Estimates
cover a huge range, from 10,000 to 300,000.
China followed conflicting policies reflecting conflicting interests.  Generally, China
tacitly accepted the refugees so long as their presence was underground and/or not highly
visible.  China also allowed foreign private non-government groups (NGOs), including South
Korean NGOs, to provide aid to the refugees, again so long as their activities were not highly
visible.  China barred any official international aid presence, including any role for the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees.  It also interrupted its general policy of tacit
acceptance with periodic crackdowns that included police sweeps of refugee populated areas,
rounding up of refugees, and returning them to North Korea.  
Chinese officials for years urged North Korea to adopt agricultural reforms similar to
China’s reforms since the late 1970s, including the abolition of collective farms and
communes.  However, North Korea remains as China’s last communist ally, and China
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supports the North Korean regime and trying to prevent any scenario that would lead to a
collapse of the Pyongyang regime.  Chinese officials fear that too much visibility of the
refugees and especially any U.N. presence could spark an escalation of the refugee outflow
and lead to a North Korean regime crisis and possible collapse.  China’s crackdowns are
sometimes a reaction to increased visibility of the refugee issue.  China’s interests in
buttressing North Korea also has made China susceptible to North Korean pressure to crack
down on the refugees and return them.  The Chinese government also appears reluctant to
establish the precedent of allowing any United Nations presence on its soil.
The new situation in 2002 resulted from the activism of several South Korean and
European NGOs, which decided to confront China and North Korea on the refugee issue.
These NGOs assisted a small number of refugees to travel to Chinese cities where there are
foreign diplomatic missions and seek asylum from foreign governments and repatriation to
South Korea.  China’s attempts to prevent this added to the world-wide publicity, and China
eventually allowed all of these refugees to emigrate to South Korea.  China, however,
reportedly instituted another crackdown in Manchuria against both the refugee population
and the foreign NGOs.  Chinese security authorities reportedly tortured captured refugees to
gain information on the NGOs that assisted them.  South Korea, which previously had turned
refugees away from its diplomatic missions, changed its policy in response to the new
situation.  It accepted refugees seeking entrance into its missions and allowed them entrance
into South Korea, and it negotiated with China over how to deal with these refugees.
The Bush Administration gave the refugee issue low priority.  President Bush did not
raise the issue with Chinese leaders when he visited China in February 2002.  The
Administration has asserted that South Korea should have the lead diplomatically in dealing
with China.  However, the Administration’s new conditions for future food aid to North
Korea may be a response to the refugee situation.  The Administration’s demand for food
donors’ access to all regions of North Korea points to the northern provinces from which
most of the refugees have come.  Congress has been more active on the issue.  The issue has
been aired in hearings.  In June 2002, the House of Representatives passed H.Con.Res. 213,
which calls on China to halt forced returns of refugees to North Korea and give the U.N.
High Commission on Refugees access to the North Korean refugees.
Responding to South Korea’s Sunshine Policy.  U.S. responses to President
Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” has been an issue since South Korea achieved a
breakthrough in relations with North Korea with the meeting of Kim Dae-jung and North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, June 13-14, 2000.  Their joint declaration said
North Korea and South Korea would work for economic cooperation, cultural and sports
exchanges, and meetings of divided Korean families.  The summit apparently was in part the
result of Kim Dae-jung’s speech in Berlin in March 2000.  He offered to provide large scale
economic aid to rebuild North Korea’s infrastructure.  Following the summit, Seoul and
Pyongyang negotiated agreements on the restoration of a railway and road across the DMZ,
investment guarantees and tax measures to stimulate South Korean private investments in
North Korea, provision of 600,000 tons of South Korean food aid to North Korea, and flood
control projects for the Imjim River.   A meeting of defense ministers occurred but with little
result. President Kim called on the United States to support his sunshine policy by
normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea,  negotiating a missile agreement with
Pyongyang, and removing North Korea from the U.S. terrorist list.  However, the sunshine
policy stagnated after December 2000.  North Korea demanded that South Korea supply it
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with two million kilowatts of electricity and rejected a South Korean reply proposing a
survey of North Korea’s electrical grid.  North Korea broke off talks in March 2001 and
suspended implementation of the 2000 economic and family reunion agreements. 
The Bush Administration periodically issues a general statement that it supports the
sunshine policy.  However, the U.S. response to the component parts of the sunshine policy
indicates a mixed U.S. reaction.  The Clinton and Bush administrations supported South
Korea’s proposals to build a railroad and road across the demilitarized zone and assist North
Korea in flood control of the Imjim River.  They also supported North-South agreements to
reunite divided Korean families and for investment guarantees for R.O.K. firms investing in
North Korea.
However, the Bush Administration appears to have reservations over other components
of the sunshine policy.  As stated previously, the Bush and Kim administrations appear to
disagree over North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. terrorism list.  The U.S. military command
in Korea and the Central Intelligence Agency reportedly believe that North Korea has gained
greater financial flexibility to make military purchases because of the nearly $400 million
it has received from the Hyundai Corporation during 1999-2001 for the right to operate a
tourist project at Mount Kumgang in North Korea.  According to informed sources, Hyundai
made additional secret payments to North Korea.  Hyundai denies making secret payments,
but new accusations of secret payments and government subsidies to Hyundai for these
payments arose and were debated in South Korea in late 2002.  According to the South
Korean newspaper, Choson Ilbo, February 25, 2001,  U.S. officials voiced this concern to
South Korean intelligence chief, Lim Dong-won, during his visit to Washington in February
2001 and that the CIA delivered a memorandum to the R.O.K. government containing a list
of weapons that North Korea recently purchased from overseas.   The Korea Herald,
February 5, 2001, quoted a spokesman for the U.S. Military Command in Korea that “I know
that military experts at home and abroad are concerned about Pyongyang’s possible diversion
of the [Hyundai] cash for military purposes.” South Korea’s Unification Minister stated
before a Korean National Assembly committee on April 2002 that the government was aware
of a possibility that North Korea would use the Hyundai payments for military purposes.  The
Kim Dae-jung Administration has touted the Mt. Kumgang project as a highlight of its
sunshine policy.  It has decided to financially subsidize the project, which has been a big
money loser for the financially troubled Hyundai Corporation.
The Bush Administration also has reservations over Kim Dae-jung’s proposal that the
1997-1999 Four Party Talks (North and South Korea, the United States, and China) be
reconvened and used for North-South negotiation of a Korean peace agreement to replace
the 1953 Korean armistice agreement.  Past U.S. administrations endorsed North-South
negotiation of a peace agreement, and President Reagan originally proposed Four Party Talks
as a vehicle for peace negotiations.   President Kim did not raise his four party talks proposal
directly during the March 2001 summit, but Bush Administration officials appeared to be
skeptical toward President Kim’s peace initiative.  The Bush Administration appears
concerned that a peace agreement without provisions for conventional forces reductions and
pullbacks would create a false sense of security and could undermine South Korean
public/political support for the U.S. troop presence in South Korea. 
The Bush Administration is known to have concerns over North Korea’s proposal that
South Korea provide North Korea with 2 million kilowatts of electric power in the near
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future.  South Korea did not accept the proposal but offered to send a survey team to North
Korea to study North Korea’s electric system.  The Bush Administration reportedly is
concerned that 2 million kilowatts of electricity is the exact amount that the two light water
nuclear reactors, which North Korea is to receive under the Agreed Framework, would
provide North Korea.  The Administration reportedly believes that if South Korea agreed to
the North Korean proposal, this would remove incentives for North Korea to meet its
obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency to allow a full range of inspections.
The Kim Dae-jung Administration has supported the general Bush Administration goals
toward North Korea, including the U.S. position that North Korea should end its secret
uranium enrichment program under IAEA safeguards; but it has urged the Bush
Administration to make greater efforts to negotiate with North Korea and opposes economic
sanctions on North Korea..  After President Bush’s declaration of North Korea as part of an
“axis of evil,” R.O.K. officials expressed misgivings about the Bush Administration’s policy
of public pressure and warnings toward North Korea.  
North Korea’s blockage of implementation of the agreements of 2000 continued until
August 2002.  North-South relations reached a nadir in June 2002 when the North Korean
navy attacked South Korean naval units.  However, North Korea expressed “regret”over the
incident, and negotiations in August 2002 produced a family reunion held in September and
agreements to implement economic agreements of 2000.  A key agreement called for the
North and South Korean militaries to construct the rail and road linkages through the
demilitarized zone (DMZ) in east and west sectors.  Work actually began on September 18,
2002, with target dates of December 2002 for the western sector and spring 2003 for the
eastern sector.  South Korea is to supply needed materials to North Korea for the road and
rail connections.  Seoul and Pyongyang reached agreement in November 2002 on South
Korean infrastructure aid to construct a special economic zone at Kaesong inside North
Korea to attract South Korean and other outside private investment.  North Korea is to issue
a law and regulations for foreign investment at Kaesong.  
U.S.-South Korean Military Issues
South Korea’s fear of military threat from North Korea has declined since the mid-
1990s.  In June 1999, South Korean naval forces inflicted severe damage on the North
Korean navy in a serious naval clash in the Yellow Sea, which experts attributed to superior
South Korean technology and antiquated North Korean weaponry.  According to recent polls,
South Koreans increasingly do not register the same level of concern as many Americans
over a North Korean invasion threat, suspected nuclear weapons development, ballistic
missile testings, and missile sales abroad.  In congressional testimony in March 2001,
General Thomas Schwartz, U.S. Commander-in-Chief in Korea, asserted that the North
Korean military threat was growing due to the size of its forces (over one million) and
armaments, the holding of large North Korean field exercises in 2000, and especially the
concentration of artillery and multiple rocket launchers within range of the South Korean
capital, Seoul.  Schwartz’s testimony received criticism within South Korea and from a
number of U.S. experts.  The critics argue that North Korean conventional military
capabilities have eroded since the early 1990s due to the obsolescence of offensive weaponry
like tanks and strike aircraft, logistics/supplies deficiencies, the absence of major field
exercises from 1994 to 2000, food shortages among even North Korean front-line troops on
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the DMZ, and the decline in the physical and mental capabilities of North Korean draftees
after a decade of malnutrition.
Declining South Korean fears of a North Korean invasion and the inter-Korean dialogue
have produced a growing debate in South Korea over the U.S. military presence.  Small
radical groups, which demand a total U.S. military withdrawal, have been joined by a
network of non-government civic groups. Several prominent South Koreans have proposed
changes in the size and functions of U.S. troops, including a proposal to convert U.S. troops
to a peacekeeping force.  Some polls, including a poll commissioned by the State
Department’s Office of International Information Programs in September 2000, show a
majority of South Koreans in favor of a reduction in the number of U.S. troops in South
Korea.  The official U.S. position is that the United States has no plans to reduce the number
of U.S. troops in South Korea.  In March 2002, the U.S. and R.O.K. governments announced
a ten-year program to reduce by nearly 50% the bases and land used by U.S. forces in South
Korea but that the total number of 37,000 U.S. troops would remain.
The North-South summit of June 2000 intensified this debate.  The debate centers on
two issues: (1) the impact of the U.S. military presence on prospects for advancement of
President Kim’s sunshine policy and (2) disputes between the U.S. military and South
Korean civilians.  Attitudes toward one affect attitudes toward the other.  Kim Dae-jung
states that he discussed U.S. troops with Kim Jong-il at the summit and that the North
Korean leader agreed that U.S. troops should remain in South Korea.  Reportedly, however,
the two Korean leaders also discussed changing the role of U.S. troops from a military
combat force to that of peacekeepers.
This debate has been intensified by new controversies over the conduct of the U.S.
military and U.S. policy.  The Clinton Administration in its final days concluded two
agreements with South Korea that settled contentious issues.  One was a new Status of
Forces Agreement, completed in December 2000 after six years of negotiations.  It provides
that U.S. military personnel accused of particular, specified crimes would be turned over to
South Korean authorities prior to their trial and that such individuals would receive certain
legal guarantees from the R.O.K. government.  The second agreement was a settlement of
the No Gun-ri issue, which involved the report that U.S. troops had massacred Korean
civilians at No Gun-ri in July 1950 during the early stage of the Korean War.  The agreement
found that U.S. troops had killed a large number of South Korean civilians at No Gun-ri but
that there was no evidence that they were acting under orders from higher U.S. commanders.
President Clinton issued a statement of regret for the incident, but the Clinton Administration
rejected demands from South Korean groups that the United States issue a formal apology
and pay compensation to surviving family members.  The Clinton Administration also settled
with South Korea the issue of R.O.K. development of missiles.  South Korea sought
agreement to extend the range of its missiles, which had been the subject of a 1979 U.S.-
R.O.K. accord.  An agreement announced in January 2001 will allow South Korea to develop
missiles with a range of up to 187 miles, up from the 1979 limit of 112 miles.  South Korea
joined the global Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR).
Contentious issues remain.  U.S. military personnel accidentally killed two South
Korean children in 2002, sparking an outcry of South Korean complaints and demands that
the soldiers be turned over to R.O.K. authorities for trial.  A South Korean court in April
2001 ordered compensation for 14 Korean civilians, who claimed injury from a U.S.
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bombing exercise; the court ruled that the U.S. military had violated Korean law.  The Bush
Administration reportedly  decided to seek a 30% increase in South Korea’s host nation
support for U.S. troops.  The total cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea is over $2
billion annually.  The  South Korean direct financial contribution for 2002 is $490 million,
up from $399 million in 2000.  In early 2000, large-scale criticism arose in the South Korean
media and among civic groups over the  R.O.K. government’s apparent selection of the
Boeing’s F-15K fighter over European competitors as South Korea’s next generation fighter.
The controversy arose over reports and statements that the selection was made under pressure
from the Bush Administration.
Political Issues
As South Korea moved from the authoritarian regimes of the past to more
democratically-based governments of the last decade, U.S. officials have been prominent in
encouraging greater pluralism and democratic process.  Free elections have been held since
1987.  Kim Dae-jung won the December 1997 presidential election with 40% of the vote.
However, throughout much of his term, the National Assembly has been controlled by the
opposition party.  President Kim’s economic reform program, strong economic growth in
1999 and 2000, and the North-South summit of June 2000 gained him considerable popular
support.  Since late 2000, however, his popularity has slipped due to a slackening of
economic growth, the uneven progress of his sunshine policy toward North Korea, and
reports of corruption in his government.  President Kim has been criticized for attempting
to impose restrictions on newspapers which criticize his policies.  The next presidential
election is scheduled for December 2002.  President Kim is limited to one term under the
R.O.K. constitution.  His 1997 election opponent, Lee Hoi-chang, will represent the
opposition Grand National Party.  President Kim’s Millennium Democratic Party has
nominated Roh Moo-hyun, a former labor union lawyer.  Roh in the past has advocated a
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.  He now says U.S. troops should remain but
that South Korea should gain equality in the security relationship.  In September 2002,
Chung Mong-joon, son of the founder of the Hyundai group of companies, entered the race.
He drew significant support in the polls from his successful organizing of the World Cup
soccer tournament in South Korea in June 1992.
